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ABSTRACT
The behavior of several stochasticdynamic rational expectations models
is studied when policy behavior can be described by a linear rule. Four
policy components are distinguished: a current response component, a
feedback component, an open—loop component and a stochastic component.
Policy is evaluated in terms of the current and asymptotic first and second
moments of the state variables. The importance of distinguishing between
variability and uncertainty is brought out. The conditional variance is
argued to be the appropriate measure of uncertainty. The analysis is
applied to a model of foreign exchange market intervention.
Willem H. Buiter





In a number of recent papers (Kareken, MuenchandWallace [1973], LeRoy
[1975], Friedman [1975, 1977], Wog]otn [1979], Black [1976, 1977]. Boyer
[1978] Roper and.Turnovsky [1978], Siegel [1978] and Wogiom [1979]), th
abilityof the policy authorities to stabilize the economy hasbeenshown
to depend in an important way on the extent to which the current value of
the policy instrument(s) can be made a function of current random distur-
bances——more precisely of the innovations in these disturbances. This
issue is especially important for financial policy and foreign exchange
marketintervention and exchange rate management. Financial policy in-
struments, be they financial asset stocks, interest rates or exchange rates
can be adjusted virtually continuously and costlessly. Some financial
market data (e.g., exchange rate observations, stock prices and trans-
actions in government debt) are observable and available on a fairly cur-
rent basis. Such currently observable data provide information about the
sources of random shocks to the economy. Financial policy should be con-
ducted in such a way as to extract the information contained in observ-
able financial market data and exploit it in achieving the authorities'
stabilization objectives.
In this paper I evaluate the effect of general linear policy rules on
the behavior of a number of stochastic linear rational expectations models.
This extends the analysis of Aoki and Canzoneri [1979] who only consider
feedback policy. The implications of the policy rules are evaluated by
considering the first two moments of the joint distribution of the state
variables of the model. The short—run policy effects are measured by the
single period mean and variance. The long—run policy effects are evaluated
by considering the steady—state mean and variance (see also Turnovsky
[1976]).—2—
The importance ofdistinguishingoetween variability and uncertainty
isbrought out. The current period variance can be vowedasthe sum of
an anticipated component arid anunanticipatedcomponent. Bymakinguse of the
information contained in currently observed variables the policy authority
can reduce——and in the simple models of Poole, Boyer and Siegeleliminate——
theanticipated variance of the target variables. It cannot affect the
unanticipated component. This unanticipated component is, as Siegel [1978]
points out, given by the conditional variance——the conditionalsecond
moment about the conditional mean, where the conditioning information setis
the subset of the state that is currently observed.
The formal analysis is presented in Section 2. An application to
Boyer's model of foreign exchange market intervention complements the
theoretical exposition.
2. General Linear Policy Rules in Linear Rational Expectations Models
The simplest possible linear rational expectations model is given in
equation (1).
(1) z Az+Bz +Cx +u.
t t—1itt—i tt
z
is a vector of endogenous (or state) variables. x is a vector of
policy instruments. u is a vector of i.i.d. random disturbances with
a zero mean vector and contemporaneous variance—covariance matrix EU
is the rationalexpectation of t asof t—i. It is defined by
ztlcj =E(zI).
I. is the information set, common tothe public
and private sectors, available at the beginning of period t—i.E isthe
mathematical expectation operator. Equation (1) will be generalized in





Inequation (1'), if policy at t can be based on information that became
availableint—l(or t),it willhebased on more recent information than
was available when private agents formed expectations ofinperiod
t—2, even ifateach point in time,public and private agents have the
same information available. Multi—period nominal wage or price contracts
can generate models like (1').
(1") z =Azi+ BizI + BZt+iIt+Cx + Ut.
In (1") the current value of z depends on current expectations of the
future and on past expectations of the present. An example of such a
model Is an IS—LM model with a Lucas supply function. If Pt denotes the
log of the price level, current real output is a function of Pt t!t—l
The real interest rate will be a function of
t+lIt
— In(1'") agents
last period made forecasts two periods into the future.
(1") z =Azi+ BZt+iIti.+ Cx + Ut
Policy behavior is specified in equation (2)
0 1 — 1/
(2) x =Gz+ Cz1 + x + Vt. —
GZ
is the "current response component" of the policy rule. Current
realizations of the state partly determine the current value of the in-
strument. This will be interpreted in more detail below. GZi is the
"feedback component" of the policy rule'x is the non—stochastic "open
loop component" ofthe policyrule. It is known in advance for all future
time. v is a randomvector representingthe "stochastic component" of
the policy rule' It is i.i.d. with a zero mean vector. Its contemporaneous
variance—covariance matrix is and its contemporaneous covariance matrix V—4---





(3) 1 ,C,z•,x•,z •,x ., x, , }
t—1tt t—1t—1t—1t--i—u tU VUV
Thusboth sectors know the deterministic and stochasticstructure of the
model. Policy behavior can be forecast using (4).
0 1 —
(4) x.=Gz .+Gz.±. i>0
tt—1t t t-.it t—lt—it
Themodel of equation 1 containsthe "policy surprise model," according
towhich only unanticipated policy matters, as a special case.Note that
e can be contained in z. If thesubmatrix b1 of B1 corresponding to
is equal to the negative of the C matrix, policy entersthe model
only as C(x —x). tt—l t
Therational expectations solution of the model givenin (1), (2)
and (3) is given in (5).








Aoki and Canzoneri analyze the special caseof this model when the
policy rule is simplified by settingG and identically equal to zero.
Considerable interest attaches to the dependenceof the first two
moments of this stochastic difference equation onthe various components
of the policy rule. It is to this that we nowturn.— 5--
The asymptotic mean and variance of z
By successive substitution in (5), z can be expressed as in (7):
t—1 t—2j — t—2j —
(7)zII A.z0 + e TI A.e.1+ Cx + TI
i=0 j=O i=0
- j=Oi=O
If the policy matrices G and were time—invariant, i.e., =Gand
=G1,and if the open—loop component were a constant , equation (7)
simplifies to:
t—l_.
(71)z=Atz0+ E Ae •+E ACx
t j=0tJj=O






If all characteristic roots of A have modulus less than unity, the mean
function will, as tapproachesinfinity, approach the limit:
(9) 1im==[I_A)1Cx t-
Thusthe asymptotic or steady state mean function will in general depend on
three of the four policy components: the current response component
(G° in A), the feedback component (C1 in A) and the open—loop component.
The stochastic disturbance term e in (5) is i.i.d. with a zero mean
vector and contemporaneous variance—covariance matrix E given by
(10) E =(I
—CG0)[CE C' + CE+E C' + E ](I—CG°)1 e t v uv uv u t
Letz denote the deviation of the state variable from its unconditional
mean, i.e. =z
—z.The unconditional variance of z, for the case
in which G is time—invariant is given in (11).— 6--
(11) E(z* z*') +AA'
2A'2 +.... + Atl
tL e C e C
Theunconditionalasyml)tOtiC var:i.aitcc ofis given by
(12) urn E(z* z*') = + +,2 + t t ze e e t-
Ifthe eigenvaluesof A all have modulus less than unity, theright—hand
side of (12) will converge to the expression given in (13).
(13) =
—1
is a matrix whose typical component is given by w.. =p..(1—X.X.)
th .
A.is the icharacteristicroot of A. p.. is the typical component of
the matrix N which is defined by: M =e''or M' =. denotes
a matrix consisting of columns of the right--characteristic vectors of A.
Note that E depends on the current response matrixG0 and on the
second moment of the stochastic component of policy,and .
Evenif the current response matrix were the zero matrix and even if
policy behavior were non—stochastic (E = = 0),policy will affect
the asymptotic variance of z, because E depends not only on e' but also
on A, which is a function of the feedback componentC1. Both the first
and second moments of the steady—state distribution of will therefore
in general depend on the deterministic components of the policy rule, even
if there is no current response of the instrument vector to the state
vector.
The unconditional single—period mean and variance of z
From equation (5) it is easily seen that the unconditional single—period
(or current—period) expectation of z is:
(14) E(z) =Atzt1+ tt—7—
This is a function of the current rcsponse component,in A andC,
of the feedback componentinand of th? open—loop component x.
The unconditional current—period or singl c—period variance of z is
(15) E(z z')= E(ee')=e,t
Thusthe single—period unconditional variance of z depends on the current
response component, G, and on the stochastic component, Liand It
is independent of the open—loop component and of the feedback com-
ponent G. Boyer [1978], Roper and Turnovsky [1978] and Black [1976, 1977]
analyze foreign exchange market policies aimed at minimizing the uncon-
ditional single—period variance of real income. Woglom [1979] analyzes
a rational expectations extension of Poole's model (Poole [1970]) in which
a monetary policy rule is chosen that minimizes the single—period uncon-
ditional variance of real income. The policy rule consists of a current
response component and a feedback component. Woglom's conclusion that the
variance of real income is independent of the feedback component is correct
for the single—period variance but not for the asymptotic variance.
In general, the stabilization policies pursued by the authorities can
be represented as the selection of values for the policy matrices that will
minimize some bilinear formofthe appropriate variance—covariance matrix,
i.e. minimize w E w with respect to C° and G1 or minimize w E w with
respect to °.1w sa row vector, w2 a column vector.
1 e 2
The conditional single—period mean and variance of z
The interpretation of the current response component of policy is by
no means obvious. The value of the policy instruments in period t, x, is
made contingent ontherealized value of the state vector in period t,z.
Thisrealized or equilibrium value of the state vector is in turn co—determined—8--
by the value assigned to the policy instrument vector n t. The ability to
plan and execute current policy decisions contingent on thecurrentvalue
of the state vector, requires thatthe statevector can be currently ob-
served,whoiiy or partly. Current policy is determined on the basis of at
least partial information about the current state. Such partial information
about the current state can be modelled in many ways. Onenatural way to
proceedis to take an errors—in—variables approach: the policy maker at
timetdoesnot observe z but z =zc, where is a random, i.i.d.
0' 1 — observationerror. If the true policy rule were x Cz + + x,
this would provide an explanation of the error termv In the policy func-
tion, because the policy rule can now be rewritten as:x =Gz+ +
+v,where v = This is not the approach adopted in this paper.
Instead I shall assume that when the response ofx to is decided, the
policy authority observes some linear combination of the current state,
i.e. he observes If is invertible, knowledge oftYis equivalent
to the observation ofz, as the policy authority knows We do not
assume to be invertible but we do assume it to be of full rank. The
current response of the policy instrument is a linear -function of this
currently accrued information. Thus the current response matrix Gcan
be viewed as the product of the current information matrix
tpand the
true current policy response matrix G.
(16) =
Ifthe private sector has access to the same partial informationas the
public sector, and if it is uncertainty about rather than merely
ability of z that matters, the conditional variance ofz rather than its
unconditional variance should be evaluated, with 'conditional'referring
to the knowledge of—9—
The conditional. first moment is found quite easily.
(17) E(Z IWtZt) 'tet' -- Eet' te't']l
Thus the conditional expectation of is a weighted average of the uncon—
ditional expectation and the c.urrent partial observation on z. Consider
some special cases. In the information matrixis invertible, E(zIz) =
asif the complete state is currently observed. If the information matrix is the
null matrix, E(zI!1z) =Azi+ When there is no information con-
ditioning the forecast, the conditional expectation equals the unconditional
expectation. Note that unless there is full current information, the con-
ditional expectation will depend on C0, C1, ,Eand E
t t tV UV
The conditional variance of that we are interested in is given in
(18). It is the conditioning information set.
(18) Var (zII) =E([z
—E(zjI)][z —E(ztjlt)]II)
This is indeed the most appropriate definition of the uncertainty about
the conditional second moment of z around the conditional mean of z. It
is instructive, however, to first consider the unconditional variance about
the conditional mean, given in (19).
(19)
Twolimitingcases arise when is invertible (the full current information
case) and when is the zero matrix (the no current information case).
When is invertible, the unconditional variance about the conditional
mean is zero. When is the zero matrix the unconditional variance about
the conditional mean equals Ze the unconditional variance about the un-
conditional mean. The unconditional variance about the conditional mean
depends on the current information matrix and on the determinants of—1 0—
the unconditional variance about the unconditional mean, .Thelatter e,t
is, as was shown in equation (10), a function of the current response
matrix G° and of the stochastic component of policy, through and.
Let(zt —E(ztII))(z —E(zII))be denoted by P. Ifis on n--vect:or,
will be an n x n matrix. vec (A) denotes the n2 X 1 column vector COfl—
sisting of the nstacked columns of A,i.e.vec(A) =[X1A2 ..
isthe th column of A. To obtain the conditional expectation of A is
thereforeequivalentto obtaining the conditional expectation of vec(A).
The information set conditioning the expectation is the variance—covariance
matrix of the disturbances, and the current observation 'A'p'. We can
e ttt
express this in "vec" form by using the result that vec(ABC) =(C'A) vec(B)
(Nissen [1968]). Thus the information set conditioning the expectation is
= vec(P))',vec(E)'}
We then apply the formula for the linear least squares predictor (see. Shiller
[1978]):
(20) E[vec(AY lIt] =I[E(I'It)]'E(It'(vec(At))}
It is readily seen that the evaluation of (20) will in general be extremely
messy. E(I'It) and E[I'(vec(A))']involve expectations of fourth powers
of the elements of the z vector. The assumption of normality of the distur-
bances is therefore essential for practical purposes.
reignexchange market
intervention
It is quite easy to derive the explicit solution for the two—dimensional
case (z =(zi,z2)') when only z1 is observed concurrently. This cor-
responds to the case studied by Poole [1970], in which the interest rate
(or money stock) is observed concurrently but real income is not. It is also—11—
the case studied by Boyer and by Roper and Turuovsky in which the exchange
rate (or money stock) is observed concurrently but: real output is not.
Forthe two variable case, o. a .Iftlic first variable, e 11 12
La12
a22
isobserved while the second one is not, =[-0]. Applying(20)






E[(z1_E(z1II)) (z2_E(z2II)) I] 0
2 2 —l
E[(z2_E(z9!') IiJ a22—a12a11
The simplicity of this result is due to the fact that z1 is observed con-
currently; E(z1_E(z1jI)ll) is therefore equal to zero. Because of this
special structure, the conditional variance about the conditional mean
equals the unconditional variance about the conditional mean, given by (19).
Note that the conditonal variance of the unobserved variable will be strictly
less than the unconditional variance, unless the errors in the reduced form






], where p12 is the correlation
coefficient between e1 and e2.
As an example, consider Boyer's model of foreign exchange market inter—
5/








z2 is real output, z1the spot exchange rate, G the level of government
spending andM the stock of money. u1is the goods market disturbance,
u2 the moneymarket disturbance. The exchange rate is observedcon-
currently,the level of output is not. There are two non—stochastic cur—
rentresponse policy functions, relating the level of government spending






Substituting (23) and (24) into (21) and (22) we obtain the reduced form
equations
(25) z1 =[u2
—u][a+ c + d —b 1 m g
(26) z2 =[(c+ d6)Ui + (a —bg)U2}
[a + c + gI1


















=U1 U2 U1U2 =
222cr
U1U2 U1U2
The conditional variance of output about its conditional mean, with the







The conditional variance can, with a little arithmetic, he showntohe
equal to the minimal, value of the unconditional variance. Thelat:teris
obtained byminimizing (27) withrespect to thepolicy instruments and
Thuscurrent response policy can alter (and ingeneralreduce) the
anticipatedvariability of currently unobserved real income. It cannot
alter the residual uncertainty (i.e. the unanticipated variance) of real
income, if private agents have the same information as the public economic
agent engaged in the current response policy.
The essence of this result, that the policy authorities can affect the
single—period anticipated variance but not the single—period unanticipated
variance should survive generalization to a greater number of instruments
and state variables. Note however, that in the example under consideration,
the number of unobserved variables (1) equals the number of linearly inde-
pendent policy instruments (1). If the number of unobserved variables (or
more generally the order of the rank deficiency of the 'Y matrix) were to
exceed the number of linearly independent instruments, the policy authorities
will not be able to eliminate all anticipated variance. A trivial example
is a "model" consisting of a single stochastic state variable and no in-
struments. If the state variable is observed concurrently, the single—
period conditional variance Var(ztz) is zero. This however is not the
minimized value of the unconditional variance, Var(z), which is indepen-
dent of the non—existent instrument. If randomness is incorporated in the
policy reaction function, the single—period conditional variance will de-
pend on the stochastic component of policy. A multi—period objective
T
functionssuch as E E(z till) will also yield a role for policy in
t=l
reducing true uncertainty.
One— and two—period 1aged expec tat Ions of the current s tate
To endow a macroeconomic rational expectations model, open or closed,
with the inertia or sluggishness in price and quantity adjustment character-
istics of many commodity and labor markets, it is necessary to introduce—14—
expectations of z formed at severaldifferent datesbeforet.The pro-
cedure willbe illustratedwithore--and two—period forecasts of x. The
extensionto an arbitraryfinite lengthoftheforecasthorizoncanbe
found in Aoki and Canzoneri [1979]. The new state equationis equation (1').
The "policy surprise" version of the model isobtained by assuming that x
is again included in z. b1 and b2 are thesubmatrices of B1 and B2 cor-
responding to xdti and xtk2. If —cb1 + b2, policy can onlyaffect
the behavior of via policy forecast errors. Because of the lagin ex-
pectation formation, however, deterministic feedbackcontrol (G) now can
affect the single—period variance of z. This is because policy forma-
tion can be. based on more recent information than was available to private
(and public) agents when some of the expectations that influencethe cur-
rent state were formed.
The rational expectations solution of equations (1') and (2) is most
easily found by the method of undetermined coefficients.After substitut-
ing (2) in (1') we obtain











(30e)e =(I- (Cv + u)
Usethe tentative solution given In (31) to derive and
ztlt2•—15—
(31)z =+R1 z1+R2 e +R3e_1
Substitutingthese expressions for and into(29)and equating
coefficients between (29) and (31) we obtain the following expressions for
R0, R1, R2 and R3 (all relevant inverses areassumed to exist).
(32a) [I -
(K2+ K3)]1 K0
(32b) =[I—(K+ 1(3)11 K1
(32c) R2 =I
(32d) R3= -(I — K3(I -(K2+ K3))1 K1
Aspointedout by Aoki and Canzoneri [1979], the number of lagged expecta-
tions of the current price can be extended without technical complications.
If the earliest forecast of z in a generalization of (29) is the
solution analogous to (31) will be a first order difference equation with
an (n_l)th order serially correlated disturbance vector.
Equations (30), (31) and (32) make clear how the four components of a
linear policy rule, current response, feedback, open—loop and stochastic,
affect the probability distribution function of the z• The major dif-
ference between this model and the single period forecast lag model of
equations (5) and (6) is that the stochastic process that characterizes
the disturbances is now also affected by the feedback component of the
policy rule. The matrix R3, premultiplying the lagged disturbance term
1 0 ei is a function of (as well as of Ge). As before we can derive the
unconditional asymptotic mean and variance—covariance matrix of z and the
conditional and unconditional single—period means and variances. For rea-
sons of apace this is left as an exercise.--16--
Expectationsof thefuture
Rationalexpectations models incorporating past or current expectations
of the future are significantly more difficult than ilioe incorporatingonly
past expectations of the present——thekinds of models considered so far.
The simplest case involves forecasts no more than one period into the future.
Such a model is given in equation (1"). Combining it with the poli.c.y rule
(3) we obtain:
(33)z =K+ K1zt+ K2zI+K3z+iI
+e
where
(34a) K° (I —CG0) Cx
t t




(34e) e =(I—CG)(Cv + u)
Equation (33) can be used to solve for z as a function of z
tlt—l t+lt—1
z11= [I—K2]1K + [I —K2]1K'Zi+ [I —K2]1K3Z+iIi
in turn depends onz÷j1:
zt+11t1I_K2]1K+i+I_K2]'K1[I_K2]1Kt
where A[I —[I-K2]1K1[l-K2]1K311.
To find a unique solution for (33) therefore requires not only an
initial condition for but also a condition on the expectation forma——1.7-
tion process. With such a condition, which has frequently been chosen to
be a "terminal condition" on the asynptotic behavior of the forecasting
process, we can solve for z1_1andthus also for Substituting
thesesolutions in (33) we obtain the rational expectationssolutionof
themodel which can now be ured for policy simulation and optimization.
To save space, I shall discuss the non—uniqueness issue in the con-
textof the very similar model given by equation (1'"), which has economic
agents forecastingmore than one period intothe future.
Combining(1'") with the policyrule (2) we obtain (35).
(35) =K+ K1z+ K2z+l+ e
where
(36a)K° =(ICG0)1 Cx














Siniply specifying an initial condition for say z0,in(35) does there-
fore not suffice to yield a unique solution. (35) is asecond—order dif--
ference equation.We need an additional set cf restrictions on the ex-
pectations formation process to yield a unique solution(seeTaylor [1977]
andShiller [1978]). Sometimes the conditjon that the expectationformation
process be stable suffices to finda unique solution, but thi.s is notgen-
erally true. Another important aspect of the solution to(37)has been
brought out by Shiller [1978]. Lead (37a) by k periods and take the con-
ditional expectation as of t—l. This gives:
(38)ZF1÷k t-lIKK] [Kt+k+l+KKt+k]+ KKJKKzt1+kIt—l
+ [I_K'K2]K2zt+2+kJt—l
(38) is a partial difference equation in k and t.It therefore requires an
infinite number of terminal conditions to specify thesolution completely.
For each t, we. have a difference equation in k which requires anapproprIate
terminal condition for its solution. For a different t,this whole process
needs to be repeated. In Shiller's words ".... peoplein effect change
their minds in each time period about terminal conditions"[Shiller, 1978,
p. 26]. Clearly, the conceptualand technical problems involved here have
only just begun to be explored. Having found asolution for zt+llt_l we
substitute it into (35)and obtain a model which no longercontains any
expectations terms.
A fairly arbitrary but simple way of cutting the Gordian knot of non—
uniqueness is given by Chow [1978]. He assumes that for somesufficiently
large T, ZT+lIT_1 is proportional or equal to Substituting zT+l!T1 =
2TIT—l
into equation (35) for t =T,we obtain
={I+K2[I -K2]1}K +fI + K2[I —K2]1}K'zTl + eT
Equation (39) can now be used to derive zTIT2• This yields:—19-
(40) ZTT2
1 + K[T -.K"]1}K0 + l K[1 —
ZT1IT2
isfoundby taking expectations of (35)fort T—l.We obtain
(41)
ZTlT2
=K1+ KZT2 + K2ZTJT2
SubstitutingZT1IT2
from(41) into (40) we obtainZTT2 as afunction ot
known parameters and z ,.Thissolution for z is then substituted TT--2
into (35) for t =T—l.This yields:
(42) ZT1
=[I+ K2[I -(I+ K2[I —K2]1)K1K2] 1] K
+ K2[I —(I+ K2[I —K2]1)K'K2] [I + K2[I —K2]1]K1K1
+ [I + K2[I —(I4- K2[I —K2]1)K1K2] 1[I+K2[I-K2] ']K1]K'zT2 +eTl
(42) can then be used to find
zTlIT3
(which requires the evaluation of
zT2IT3). This solution for 2T—ljT—3 is then substituted into ZT_2=
+
K'ZT3 + K2ZTitT 3
+ eT2. In this way, equation (35) is solved
backward in time. In general the equation for is
T o
-
zRz+ E D •K.+e
t t t—l t,iit
Thisis also the general form of the solution for (33) if we impose the
condition that for some large T,
zT+lIT
=
ZT•Rt and Dt. are functions of
K1 and K2 derived by repeated application of theprocedure outlined in
equations (37a) —(42).
Note that with e given by (36d) the single—period unconditional vat iance
of will depend on the current response component of policy, C° and on
the stochastic components, Z and Z ,butnot on the feedback component
G'. The asymptotic variance wiii however alsodepend on the feedback com-
ponent. The single—period unconditional mean and the asymptotic mean depend—20—
on the current response component ,theiee(lb1f'k component and on the open—
1001) component, which i enibecided in K?.
Conclusion
The scope for policy in the four models given by equations (1) —(1'")
canbe summarized as follows. The conditional and unconditional means of
the state vector z, whether single—period or asymptotic, will depend on
the three non—stochastic policy components, C0, G1 and x .Throughits
dependence on e' the conditional mean will also depend on the stochastic
component of policy. The asymptotic variance will depend on all four policy
components. The unconditional single—period variance will depend on the cur-
rent response component and the stochastic component, but not on the feed—
back component, except in the case of model (1') which incorporates several
lagged forecasts of the current value of z.
If variability of z, whether anticipated or unanticipated, is of con-
cern to the policymaker, the unconditional variance is the appropriate focus
of policy concern. If uncertainty about z, i.e. unanticipated variability
is what matters, the conditional variance is the appropriate object
of policy design. In Poole's and Boyer's models the single—period
conditional variance of output is independent of the current response
component of policy. The design of optimal linearpolicy rules in
stochastic dynamic rational expectations models along the lines sketched
here, has applications in virtually all areas of macroeconomic stabiliza—
tipn policy.FOOTNOTES
important gencralization oF equation(2)would be to make x1
depend on current or past predictions of the future or the present,e.g.
[2']x =GZ+ + v +
j=O i=O
The analysis of the simpler equation (2) is still sufficiently complex
forme not to optfor the greater generality of (2') as yet. I am in-
debtedto Pentti Kouri for bringing this up,
-'SeeChow [1975] and Buiter [1979].
has been objected by several colleagues that an instrument——
almost by definition——is something that can be controlled without error.
I would argue that it is better to model any behavioral relationship,
and certainly one representing the actions of a complex, bureaucratic
organization like a central bank or a treasury, as stochastic.
--"The matrices I —CGand I —(I
—
CG)'B1 are assumed to be of
full rank.
-'Thefirst formal analysis of optimal foreign exchange market inter-
vention was in Stein [1963].
-'Because of the lineardependence of the two policy reaction functions,
onecould be dropped without changing the analysis. The exposition stays
as close as possible to Boyer's original analysis.REFERENCES
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